The Supreme Court (Number of Judges) Act, 1956 is the law that fixes the sanctioned strength of judges of the Supreme Court of India, enacted under the power Article 124(1) of the Constitution gives Parliament to decide this number by law. Parliament has amended it several times since 1956 as the Court's workload has grown, most recently in 2026.
Aims and Objectives
Article 124(1) leaves the number of Supreme Court judges, other than the Chief Justice of India, to be fixed by Parliament by law rather than by the Constitution itself. The Act exists to let Parliament periodically revise this sanctioned strength in step with the Court's caseload, so a court with no fixed ceiling under the Constitution's original scheme can still expand as pendency grows.
Important Provisions / Evolution of Sanctioned Strength
- Nodal Ministry: Ministry of Law and Justice, Government of India.
- 1950: 8 judges (Chief Justice of India plus 7 puisne judges), as originally envisaged by the Constitution.
- 1956: Raised to 11, via the original Supreme Court (Number of Judges) Act, 1956.
- 1960: Raised to 14.
- 1978: Raised to 18.
- 1986: Raised to 26.
- 2009: Raised to 31.
- 2019: Raised to 34 (33 plus CJI), via the Supreme Court (Number of Judges) Amendment Act, 2019.
- 2026: Raised to 38 (37 plus CJI), via the Supreme Court (Number of Judges) Amendment Act, 2026 — approved by the Union Cabinet on 5 May 2026, given interim effect through a Presidential ordinance, and subsequently enacted by Parliament.
Significance
- Expands Court Capacity: Additional judges allow more Benches to sit in parallel, directly expanding the Supreme Court's capacity to hear original, appellate and writ matters.
- Funded from the Consolidated Fund: Expenditure on judges' salaries and supporting infrastructure arising from an increase in strength is met from the Consolidated Fund of India.
- Addresses Pendency, but Only Partly: Each increase has historically been justified by rising case pendency before the Court, though legal commentators note that numerical expansion alone does not resolve structural causes of delay, such as case-filtering mechanisms and vacancy-management practices.
