A recent investigative report raised concerns over a potential conflict of interest in India's new deep-tech fund. It found that 62% of the ₹2,000 crore disbursed in the fund's first round went to ventures linked to members of the selection panel.

When the fund was set up, India had very few deep-tech startups to choose from, so the panel picked mostly people it already knew — founders, mentors, and companies it had worked with before. This article is a response from India's Chief Economic Advisor, a senior government official defending a fund the government itself set up; he says so openly, right at the start, admitting he is not a neutral outsider but part of the government being criticised.

What explains the 62% figure, and what safeguards limit the risk?

  1. Early-Applicant Skew: the panel-linked share was highest in the very first funding round, because the only applicants who knew about a brand-new fund were people already close to it. By the second round, that share had fallen sharply — to just 1 of 13 funded firms.
  2. 10% Ownership Disqualification Rule: any panel member who owns more than 10% of a venture cannot vote on funding it, and no single member can approve a deal alone — every selection needs a super-majority of the panel.
  3. 50% Government Funding Cap: the government will never fund more than half of any project's cost.
  4. Two-Tier Secretarial Review: every funding decision is reviewed twice by a separate board of senior government secretaries, with any member's recusal recorded.
  5. Five-Year Staggered Disbursement: the ₹2,000 crore is being released over five years, through several different fund managers — only two of whom have been appointed so far.
  6. Expert-Panel Selection Criterion: panel members were chosen because they are among the very few people in India who understand deep tech well, and that same expertise is what puts them close to the people applying for funding.

What are the concerns about the fund's governance?

  1. Legitimate Public-Money Scrutiny: this is public money, so it is reasonable to ask whether the process favoured people the panel already knew.
  2. Risk of Losing Future Experts: calling the panel a "cartel" based on one misleading number could scare off top technologists from ever agreeing to serve on such panels in future, leaving the fund with less expertise, not more accountability.

How should the fund's success be judged?

  1. Outcome-Based Evaluation: the real question is whether any undeserving venture got funded, or any deserving one got rejected, judged by what the panel knew at the time, not by hindsight.
  2. Committee-Process Review: understanding how the committee actually works, and whether it made any real errors, takes more effort than reading one statistic — but it is more honest than settling for a number that misleads.

Conclusion

The author sees this episode as an example of India damaging itself through scrutiny that moves too fast and looks only at the surface. He warns that treating an overlap the fund itself was designed to allow, and had already disclosed, as if it were a scandal could scare away the very experts India needs to build its deep-tech sector.

Mains Angle

GS Paper III — Science and Technology: Government funding and support mechanisms for R&D and innovation; indigenisation of technology. Also touches GS Paper II — Governance: transparency, accountability, and conflict of interest in public institutions.

Practice question: "Public funding of deep-tech innovation often requires drawing on a small pool of domain experts, raising inherent conflict-of-interest concerns. Discuss the safeguards needed to balance expert-led decision-making with public accountability, with reference to India's deep-tech funding initiatives. (250 words)"